The Bray and von Storch 5th International Survey of Climate Scientists 2015/2016

(Helmholtz-Zentrum Geesthacht, Geesthacht, Germany)

D. Bray H. von Storch





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Dennis Bray, Hans von Storch

142 pages with 119 figures and 6 tables

Abstract

This report presents the findings of a survey of climate scientists' perceptions of the global warming issue. The survey was conducted in 2015/16. The survey includes the following sections: demographics of participants, participants' assessment of climate science, the utility of models, extreme events, attribution of extreme events, climate and society, science and society.

Die Bray und von Storch Fünfte Internationale Umfrage des Klima-Wissenschaftler 2015/2016

Zusammenfassung

Dieser Report stellt die Ergebnisse einer Studie vor, welchen Klimawissenschaftler zu ihrer Sichtweise zum Thema globale Klimaerwaermung sind. Die Befragungen hierzu wurden 2015/16 durchgefuehrt.

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Introduction

In 1996, with the assistance of funding from the Thyssen Stiftung, we set out to explore the perceptions that climate scientists held regarding climate change and climate science. The methodology was quite simple. We began with a series of interviews (43 in number) with climate scientists in three countries (USA, Canada and German). A brief account of the qualitative findings can be found in Inside Science, A Preliminary Investigation of the Case of Global Warming, (Bray and von Storch, 1996: available on-line at

<u>http://www.academia.edu/2369025/Inside_science_-</u> a_preliminary_investigation_of_the_case_of_global_warming.

After analyzing the interviews, questions were formulated addressing key issues that seemed to prevail. These questions were then pretested with climate scientists and revised accordingly. Satisfied with the survey questionnaire, 500 hard copies were distributed to scientists in Germany, Denmark, Canada and the USA, each survey translated into the national language. Subsequently, it was requested that the survey be repeated in Italy and Taiwan. The reception of the results of the 1996 survey was such that we were prompted to repeat the survey in 2003. In an effort to reach a larger sample of scientists we employed an on-line survey method. After the 2003 survey we decided perhaps it would be a good idea to repeat the survey to provide a view over time of how climate scientists felt about their science and the issue of global warming. To this extent, the survey was repeated again in 2008, 2013 and again at the end of 2015/beginning of 2016. While a set of core questions are maintained, each survey subsequent to 1996 contained sets of questions addressing different specific topics. Specific to the 2051/16 survey are sections on Climate Service Centers, Extreme Events, Attribution of Extreme Events, Climate and Society and Climate Science and Society.

Results from previous surveys

1996/2003 surveys

http://www.hzg.de/imperia/md/content/hzg/zentrale_einrichtungen/bibliothek/berichte/gkss_b erichte_2007/gkss_2007_11.pdf

or complete with data set at

https://www.academia.edu/2365610/The_Bray_and_von_Storchsurvey_of_the_perceptions_of_climate_scientists_2008_report_codebook_and_XLS_data 2008 survey

http://www.hzg.de/imperia/md/content/hzg/zentrale_einrichtungen/bibliothek/berichte/gkss_b erichte_2010/gkss_2010_9_.pdf

or complete with data set at

https://www.academia.edu/2365610/The_Bray_and_von_Storchsurvey_of_the_perceptions_of_climate_scientists_2008_report_codebook_and_XLS_data

2013 survey

http://www.hzg.de/imperia/md/content/hzg/zentrale_einrichtungen/bibliothek/berichte/hzg_reports_2014/hzg_report_2014_4.pdf

or complete with data set at

<u>https://www.academia.edu/5211187/The_Bray__</u>____von_Storch_Surveys_A_survey_of_the_perceptions_of_climate_scientists_2013_report_co_____debook_and_XLS_data_____

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Note: This version differs slightly from the published version

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Sampling

The survey employed a non-probability convenience sample. Convenience sampling provides an inexpensive approximation of truth. Quite simply, the sample is selected because it is convenient. The respondents were 'preselected' in as much as they were included as they met specific criteria, i.e. had authored papers concerning climate change and published them in significant climate science journals, were currently employed in climate research institutes or have previously been used as respondents in published results concerning climate change consensus among scientists, or were on existing mailing lists of climate scientists.

In the 2008 climate survey of climate scientists, three lists were employed in constructing the sample. List one included a list of authors, affiliations and email addresses drawn from

climate journals with the 10 highest ISI impact ratings for the last 10 years. These are authors of climate related papers in peer reviewed climate related journals. The second list was the list of authors who contributed to Oreskes' (2004) published conclusions concerning consensus in the climate change issue. A third list was drawn from readily available email lists on institute web sites (i.e. NCAR, MPI, AMS, etc.). Duplicates in the three lists were removed before distribution

In 2013 the survey used the same mailing list as in 2008 with the addition of the ClimList mailing list plus the IPCC list of contributors. After removing duplicates, this resulted in a list of 5947 email addresses. 1456 proved to be non-valid, making the total distribution 4491. Invitations to participate in the survey were distributed by email, providing a link to the on-line survey. Provisions were made so that should someone submit a duplicate form the form identifier resulted in the original being over written. Consequently, for each invitation it was only possible to have one completed survey written to the data set. There were 286 valid returns, for a return rate of approximately 7%. All responses were guaranteed anonymity.

In 2015, the survey used updated lists of those employed in 2013. In total, invitations to participate in the survey were sent to 3879 valid email addresses. The survey ran from mid-December 2015 until the end of January 2016. There were 651 returns (complete and partial) for a response rate of approximately 17%, exceeding the response rates of our previous online surveys. (For a discussion of response rates to online surveys, see Bray and von Storch, 2014. A Survey of the Perceptions of Climate Scientists, 2013. pp. 2-4.)

Questions

As with previous surveys, most questions were designed on a seven point rating scale. A set of statements was presented to which the respondent was asked to indicate his or her level of agreement or disagreement, for example, 1 = strongly agree, 7 = strongly disagree. The value of 4 can be considered as an expression of ambivalence or impartiality or, depending on the nature of the question posed, for example, in a question posed as a subjective rating such as "How much do you think climate scientists are aware of the information that policy makers incorporate into their decision making process?", a value of 4 is no longer a measure of ambivalence, but rather a metric. Questions were pretested and revised accordingly.

Presentation of Data

Data is presented as descriptive statistics, including histograms, cumulative distribution frequencies and box plots, where applicable. Descriptive statistics include number of observations, means and 95% confidence intervals.

Histograms are presented as percent of observations. Histograms simply allows us to see the patterns in the data instead of the detailed information we would get from what is basically a list of numbers. The shape of the distribution indicates the skew of the data.

The cumulative distribution function shows the probability of occurrence of the corresponding value on the x axis. The chart below indicates a probability of .6 that the value of 7 will occur.



Boxplots illustrate the median, spread and data values. The box plot (a.k.a. box and whisker diagram) is a standardized way of displaying the distribution of data.

A total of 5 boxplots are presented for each variable.

1. a boxplot representing the entire number of respondents to the survey.

2. a boxplot representing the respondents who claimed to work in climate science proper claiming the focus of their work to be directly in the production of knowledge concerning climate change, working in: atmospheric modelling, oceanic modelling, measurement and observation, down scaling, physical processes, and paleoclimatology and claiming to have been affiliated with the IPCC.

3. a boxplot representing the respondents who claimed to work in climate science proper claiming the focus of their work to be directly in the production of knowledge concerning climate change, working in: atmospheric modelling, oceanic modelling, measurement and observation, down scaling, physical processes, and paleoclimatology and claiming to *not* have been affiliated with the IPCC.

4. a boxplot representing the respondents who claimed to have worked in affiliated sciences, with the focus of their work as socio-economic impact assessment, ecological impact assessment, adaptation strategies, science policy administration and other – climate related activities and claiming to have been affiliated with the IPCC.

5. a boxplot representing the respondents who claimed to have worked in affiliated sciences, with the focus of their work as socio-economic impact assessment, ecological impact assessment, adaptation strategies, science policy administration and other – climate related activities and claiming to *not* have been affiliated with the IPCC.

The category of work 'other –non-climate related' is omitted from this part of the analysis (6 respondents).

In the box plot the central rectangle (box) spans the first quartile to the third quartile (the interquartile range or IQR). To obtain quartiles, responses are sorted by value; four equal sized groups are made from the ordered responses (25% of values for each group). The lines

dividing the groups are called quartiles. The groups are referred to as quartile groups. As the values are ordered, the first quartile (25%) contains the lowest values. The inter-quartile range (IQR) – the box – contains the middle 50% of the scores. 75% of the scores fall below the upper quartile and 25% of scores fall below the lower quartile. The upper and lower whiskers represent scores outside of the middle 50%. A short box represents a high level of agreement. A long box suggests there are a number of opinions. If one box is much shorter or longer than another, this could suggest a difference between groups. The median is in the middle of the box than to the right of the box the data are skewed in that direction. If the median is closer to the right of the box then tail of the distribution is towards those values.

Structure of Survey

The survey is divided into 8 sections:

- 1. Demographics of Sample
- 2. Climate Science
- 3. Climate Service Centers
- 4. The Utility of Climate Models
- 5. Defining Extreme Events
- 6. Attribution of Extreme Events
- 7. Climate and Society
- 8. Climate Science and Society

Please keep in mind that these results reflect the opinions of the respondents to the survey, not the opinions of the authors! In previous surveys we received criticism from both 'sceptics' and 'alarmists'. We draw no conclusions in this report and present only the data as collected.

Results of the 2015/2016 Survey of Climate Scientists

Section 1. Demographics

Responses were forthcoming from some 53 countries. The majority of respondents claimed to have worked in climate science for more than 10 years. Over 90% of the respondents were employed in academic degree granting institutes or publicly funded research non-degree granting institutes.

United States	152	23.31%	Romania	4	0.61%
Germany	92	14.11%	Russian	3	0.46%
United Kingdom	62	9.51%	South Africa	3	0.46%
Canada	33	5.06%	Burkina	2	0.31%
Italy	23	3.53%	Chile	2	0.31%
Australia	22	3.37%	Mexico	2	0.31%
France	21	3.22%	Nigeria	2	0.31%
Netherlands	17	2.61%	Pakistan	2	0.31%
India	16	2.45%	Portugal	2	0.31%
Spain	15	2.30%	Uruguay	2	0.31%
Switzerland	15	2.30%	Bangladesh	1	0.15%
Norway	13	1.99%	Benin	1	0.15%
China	12	1.84%	Czech	1	0.15%
Iran	12	1.84%	Iceland	1	0.15%
Sweden	11	1.69%	Indonesia	1	0.15%
Austria	9	1.38%	Ivory	1	0.15%
New Zealand	8	1.23%	Jamaica	1	0.15%
Finland	7	1.07%	Lithuania	1	0.15%
Poland	7	1.07%	Malaysia	1	0.15%
Brazil	6	0.92%	Nepal	1	0.15%
Ireland	6	0.92%	Serbia	1	0.15%
Japan	6	0.92%	Singapore	1	0.15%
Belgium	5	0.77%	Taiwan	1	0.15%
Croatia	5	0.77%	Tanzania	1	0.15%
Denmark	5	0.77%	Uganda	1	0.15%
Greece	5	0.77%			
Israel	5	0.77%	Total	<i>n</i> = 633	100%
Argentina	4	0.61%			

Table 1. The country in which you live is?

Table 2. The approximate number of years you have worked in science is?

Number of Years	Freq	Percent
0-5	79	12.27
6-10	156	24.22
11-15	118	18.32
More than 15	291	45.19
Total complete responses	644	100

Table 3. What best describes the institute in which you work?

Type of Institute	Freq	Percent
Academic degree granting	395	61.43
Privately funded research non-degree granting	9	1.40
Publicly funded research non-degree granting	193	30.02
NGO	5	0.78
Corporate	9	1.40
Other	32	4.98
Total complete responses	643	100

Table 4. The focus of most of your work is?

Focus of work	Freq	Percent
Atmospheric modelling	134	20.78
Oceanic modelling	29	4.50
Measurement and observation	101	15.66
Down-scaling	47	7.29
Physical processes	94	14.57
Paleoclimatology	64	9.92
Socio-economic impact assessment	15	2.33
Ecological impact assessment	19	2.95
Adaptation strategies	14	2.17
Science policy administration	5	0.78
Other – climate related	117	18.14
Other – non-climate related	6	0.93
Total complete responses	645	100

Table 5. Were you involved (author, reviewer, etc.) with the 2014 IPCC AR5 Report?

IPCC Involvement	Freq	Percent
Yes	208	32
No	442	68
Total complete responses	650	100

Section 2. Climate Science





Figure 2. (v007) How convinced are you that most of recent or near future climate change is, or will be, the result of anthropogenic causes?



not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

Figure 3. (v008) Climate models accurately simulate the climatic conditions for which they are calibrated.



strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 strongly agree

12

Figure 4. (v009a) How well do you think *atmospheric models* can deal with *hydrodynamics*?









Figure 6. (v009c) How well do you think *atmospheric models* can deal with the influence of *clouds*?



very inadequate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very adequate















7 very adequate

very inadequate 1









Figure 11. (v011a) The current state of scientific knowledge is developed well enough to allow for a reasonable estimate of the effects of *turbulence* on climate?



not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

Figure 12. (v011b) The current state of scientific knowledge is developed well enough to allow for a reasonable estimate of the effects of *land surface processes* on climate?



not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

21

Figure 13. (v011c) The current state of scientific knowledge is developed well enough to allow for a reasonable estimate of the effects of *sea ice* on climate?



not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
Figure 14. (v011d) The current state of scientific knowledge is developed well enough to allow for a reasonable estimate of the effects of *greenhouse gases* from anthropogenic sources on climate?



Figure 15. (v012a) How would you rate the ability of global climate models to simulate a global mean value for temperature values for the *next 10 years*?



Figure 16. (v012b) How would you rate the ability of global climate models to simulate a global mean value for precipitation values for the *next 10 years*?



Figure 17. (v012c) How would you rate the ability of global climate models to simulate a global mean value for sea *level rise* for the *next 10 years*?



Figure 18. (v012d) How would you rate the ability of global climate models to simulate a global mean value for temperature values for the *next 50 years*?



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Figure 19. (v012e) How would you rate the ability of global climate models to simulate a global mean value for precipitation values for the *next 50 years*?



Figure 20. (v012f) How would you rate the ability of global climate models to simulate a global mean value for sea *level rise* for the *next 50 years*?



Figure 21. (v013) Since 1850, it is estimated that the world has warmed by 0.5 - 0.7 degrees C. Approximately what percent would you attribute to human causes?





ean estimation		Number of obs $=$ 587			Climata Science	IPCC Involvement	n=143
					Climate Science	No IPCC Involvement	n=282
						IPCC Involvement	n=51
	4.265758	.0359491 4.195153	4.336363	Affiliated Science	No IPCC Involvement	n=102	

Section 3 Climate Service Centers

Figure 22. (v014) Climate service centers have become a somewhat recent addition to climate research. How aware are you of the services offered by climate service centers?



31

Figure 23. (v015a) As a scientist, would you expect the role of climate service centers to be to present the results of scientific research to the public in an understandable way?



not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much

32

Figure 24. (v015b) As a scientist, would you expect the role of climate service centers to be to present to scientists new applied research questions resulting from public engagement?



Figure 25. (v015c) As a scientist, would you expect the role of climate service centers to be to operate in parallel with climate research to develop relevant knowledge for decision making?



Figure 26. (v015d) As a scientist, would you expect the role of climate service centers to be to initiate public/political reactions to the issue of climate change?



Table 6. (v016) Do you think climate service centers are a source of funding for scientific research projects?

yes – 168 (%25.85)

no – 482 (%74.15)

Section 4. The Utility of Models

We refer to dynamical process based models, not statistical models. Such climate models describe the dynamics of the atmosphere, the ocean and the cryosphere (and possibly more components) and their interactions. Such models calculate the change of state variables, such as temperature at a given time and location, and the sum of influences of various processes such as advection, conversion of energy or fluxes across boundaries, etc.



Figure 27. (v017) Your level of familiarity with such models is

Figure 28. (v018a) Such models are able to generate what level of knowledge about the functioning of the climate system and its components?



Figure 29. (v018b) Such models are able to generate what level of knowledge about the relevance of specific dynamical processes for the climate system?



Figure 30. (v018c) Such models are able to generate what level of knowledge about the future of the climate system?



Figure 31. (v018d) Such models are able to generate what level of knowledge about the past of the climate system?



Figure 32. (v019a) How much do you agree that the skill of climate models in describing possible future conditions can be derived from the physical logic/dynamics built into the model?



Figure 33. (019b) How much do you agree that the skill of climate models in describing possible future conditions can be derived from the skill of models on describing past conditions?



Figure 34. (v019c) How much do you agree that the skill of climate models in describing possible future conditions can be derived from the skill of models in describing the present conditions?



Figure 35. (v019d) How much do you agree that the skill of climate models in describing possible future conditions can be derived from the convergence of recognized climate models?





Figure 36. (v020) To what degree do you think that, through the process of downscaling, it is possible to determine local climate change?



Section 5. Extreme Events

Section 5.a. Defining Extreme Events

Figure 37. (v021a) When defining an extreme event, how would you rate the importance of considering the *damage* caused by the weather event?



Figure 38. (v021b). When defining an extreme event, how would you rate the importance of considering the *deviation from the meteorological mean*?



Figure 39. (v021c). When defining an extreme event, how would you rate the importance of the considering *probability of such an event occurring*?



Figure 40. (v021d). When defining an extreme event, how would you rate the importance of the considering the *geographic location of the event*?



Figure 41. (v021e). When defining an extreme event, how would you rate the importance of the considering the *geographic dimension of the event*?



Figure 42. (v021f). When defining an extreme event, how would you rate the importance of the considering the *duration of the event*?



Figure 43. (v021g). When defining an extreme event, how would you rate the importance of the considering the number of *human lives lost* to the event?



Figure 44. (v021h). When defining an extreme event, how would you rate the importance of the considering the *economic costs*?



Section 5.b. Extreme events where you live: convective rainfall/thunder storms

Figure 45. (v022a) In the region where you live the *frequency* of convective rainfall events / thunder storms in the *last 20 years* has





Figure 46. (v022b) In the region where you live the *intensity* of convective rainfall events / thunder storms in the *last 20 years* has



decreased 1 2 3 not changed 4 5 6 7 increased

Figure 47. (v023a) In the region where you live, what change in the *frequency* of convective rainfall events / thunder storms would you expect in the *next 50 years*





Figure 48. (v023b) In the region where you live, what change in the *intensity* of convective rainfall events / thunder storms would you expect in the *next 50 years*



decrease 1 2 3 no change 4 5 6 7 increase
Section 5.c. Extreme events on a global scale: convective rainfall/thunder storms

Figure 49. (v024a) On a global scale the *frequency* of convective rainfall events / thunder storms in the *last 20 years* has



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Figure 50. (v024b) On a global scale the *intensity* of convective rainfall events / thunder storms in the *last 20 years* has



decreased 1 2 3 not changed 4 5 6 7 increased

Figure 51. (v025a) On a global scale, what change in the *frequency* of convective rainfall events / thunder storms would you expect in the *next 50 years*?



decrease 1 2 3 no change 4 5 6 7 increase

Figure 52. (v025b) On a global scale, what change in the *intensity* of convective rainfall events / thunder storms would you expect in the *next 50 years*?





Section 5.d. Extreme events on a global scale: heat waves

3

2

decreased 1



Figure 53. (v026a) On a global scale over the *last 20 years* the *frequency* of heat waves has

not changed 4

5

6

7 increased







Figure 55. (var027a) On a global scale, what change in the *frequency* of heat waves would you expect in the *next 50 years*?



decrease 1 2 3 no change 4 5 6 7 increase

Figure 56. (var027b) On a global scale, what change in the *intensity* of heat waves would you expect in the *next 50 years*?



decrease 1 2 3 no change 4 5 6 7 increase

Section 5.e. Extreme events on a global scale: tropical storms (hurricane/typhoons)

Figure 57. (var028a) Over the *last 20 years*, the *frequency* of tropical storms (hurricanes, typhoons) has



Figure 58. (var028b) Over the *last 20 years*, the *intensity* of tropical storms (hurricanes, typhoons) has



decreased 1 2 3 not changed 4 5 6 7 increased

Figure 59. (v029a) Over the *next 50 years*, the *frequency* of tropical storms (hurricanes, typhoons) will



decrease 1 2 3 no change 4 5 6 7 increase

Figure 60. (v029b) Over the *next 50 years*, the *intensity* of tropical storms (hurricanes, typhoons) will



decrease 1 2 3 no change 4 5 6 7 increase

Section 5.f. Projections of extreme events: regional climate models

Figure 61. (v030a) How would you rate the ability of *regional climate models* to make 10 *year projections* of *convective rain storms/ thunderstorms*?



Figure 62. (v030b) How would you rate the ability of *regional climate models* to make 10 *year projections* of *heat waves*?



Figure 63. (v030c) How would you rate the ability of *regional climate models* to make 10 *year projections* of *tropical storms* (hurricanes/typhoons)?



Figure 64. (v031a) How would you rate the ability of *regional climate models* to make 50 *year projections* of *convective rain storms/thunder storms?*



not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very good

74

Figure 65. (v031b) How would you rate the ability of *regional climate models* to make 50 *year projections* of *heat waves*?



Figure 66. (v031c) How would you rate the ability of *regional climate models* to make 50 *year projections* of tropical storms (hurricanes/typhoons)?



Section 5.g. Projections of extreme events: global climate models

Figure 67. (v032a) How would you rate the ability of *global climate models* to make 10 *year projections* of *convective rainfall/thunder storms*?



Figure 68. (v032b) How would you rate the ability of *global climate models* to make 10 *year projections* of *tropical storms (hurricanes/typhoons)?*



Figure 69. (v032c) How would you rate the ability of *global climate models* to make 10 *year projections* of *heat waves*?



Figure 70. (v033a) . How would you rate the ability of *global climate models* to make 50 *year projections* of *convective rain storms/ thunder storms?*



not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very good

80

Figure 71. (v033b) . How would you rate the ability of *global climate models* to make 50 *year projections* of *tropical storms (hurricanes/typhoons)*?



Figure 72. (v033c) . How would you rate the ability of *global climate models* to make 50 *year projections* of *heat waves*?



Section 6. Attribution of Extreme Events

For some years, efforts have been underway to attribute cause of extreme events (heat waves, storms, etc.) to external drivers, in particular to elevated atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases.

Figure 73. (v034) How much do you think such efforts have provided robust evidence of attributing events to causes?



Figure 74. (v035) How much would successful attribution efforts help to disentangle the dynamics and sensitivities of the climate system?



Figure 75. (v036) If such efforts were successful, how much would the results demonstrate the urgency of reducing greenhouse gases?



Figure 76. (v037) If such efforts were successful, how much would they support the design of adaptation strategies?

7 very much

not at all 1



Figure 77. (v038) With how much certainty can we attribute recent extreme climate events to climate change (anthropogenic or otherwise)?



Figure 78. (v39a) The significance of an investigation of an individual extreme weather event that has already occurred, is to improve the planning and execution of climate adaptation strategies with the use of evidence bases planning.



Figure 79. (v039b) The significance of an investigation of an individual extreme weather event that has already occurred is to make climate change visible and convince citizens of the reality of climate change.



not significant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very significant

Figure 80. (v039c) The significance of an investigation of an individual extreme weather event that has already occurred is to try to determine a method of assessing the anthropogenic influence on extreme events.



not significant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very significant

Figure 81. (v040) How much would you agree with the following statement: "Extreme weather events are a major consequence of climate change."?



Figure 82. (v041a) How much would you agree with the following: "Extreme weather events are becoming more erratic"?



Figure 83. (v041b) How much would you agree with the following: "Extreme weather events are becoming more frequent"?



Figure 84. (v041c) How much would you agree with the following: "Extreme weather events are becoming more powerful"?


Figure 85. (v042a). How much do you think the anthropogenic influence on the climate increases the probability of the occurrence of an extreme event?



Figure 86. (v042b) How much do you think the anthropogenic influence on the climate increases the intensity of an extreme event?



Figure 87. (v042c) How much do you think the anthropogenic influence on the climate increases the frequency of an extreme event?



Section 7. Climate and Society





Figure 89. (v044) How much are we beginning to experience the more gradual impacts of climate change, anthropogenic or otherwise?



Figure 90. (v045) Over the issue of climate change, the general public should be told to be:



unconcerned 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very worried

Figure 91. (v046) It should be the responsibility of climate scientists to tell the general public how much they should be concerned about climate change.



Figure 92. (v047)Considering the advances of the understanding of climate change in the last 5 years, would you say climate change has become?

> 1 a less urgent global issue 2 3 4 the level of urgency has not changed 5 6 7 a much more urgent global issue











Climate Science	IPCC Involvement	n=135
	No IPCC Involvement	n=255
Affiliated Science	IPCC Involvement	n=53
	No IPCC Involvement	n=95

Figure 93. (v048) Today, do you think the negative impacts of climate change will be







Figure 94. (v049) Today, do you think the negative impacts of sea level rise will be

1 much less than you thought five years ago 4 the same as you thought five years ago





Figure 95. (v050) Climate change discourse in general (scientific, public, political) is driven by



7 public/political sentiment

Figure 96. (v051a) If we do not do anything towards adaptation or mitigation, the potential for catastrophe in the next 10 years resulting from climate change for the country in which you live is



Figure 97. (v051b) If we do not do anything towards adaptation or mitigation, the potential for catastrophe in the next 50 years resulting from climate change for the country in which you live is



Figure 98. (v052a) If we do not do anything towards adaptation and mitigation, the potential for catastrophe in the next 10 years resulting from climate change for other parts of the world is



Figure 99. (v052b) If we do not do anything towards adaptation and mitigation, the potential for catastrophe in the next 50 years resulting from climate change for other parts of the world is



Section 8. Climate Science and Society

Figure 100. (v053) Science should be for the people, and governments should direct scientific resources into area that would prove to be of the greatest benefit for society.



Figure 101. (v054) Rather than being designed within science, research priorities should be put forward by individuals and groups who are in touch with genuine social needs.









Figure 103. (v056) Citizens should shape the subjects and contents of what is considered to be scientific knowledge.



Figure 104. (v057) Science should be reorganized so that citizens directly determine how knowledge is produced.









Figure 106. (v059) Scientists should not consider the moral implications of their work as this prevents facts from being distorted by ideologies.



Figure 107. (v060) Science should be conducted only within the closed community of scientists and only by those trained in scientific disciplines.



Figure 108. (v061) Scientists should focus on knowledge according their own moral and political commitments.



Figure 109. (v062) Scientists should work to link science with public moral and political concerns.



Figure 110. (v063) The credibility of scientific claims is partly determined by the moral qualities of the author.



Figure 111. (v064) The main form of scientific debate among scientists should be based on:



emotions and values 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 reason and logic

Figure 112. (v065) Science is a defined set of practices and ideas that are not generally found or used outside of science.



Figure 113. (v066) As the values of non-scientists are taken into account, how much have scientific ideas been distorted to service political arguments concerning climate change?



123

Figure 114. (v067) The seriousness of potential environmental scares needs to be investigated before doomsday stories get out of hand.









Figure 116. (v 69) The collective authority of a consensus culture of science paralyzes new thought.



In 1996, climate science was described as being a post-normal science. This meant that: 1. the scientific claims had a high level of uncertainty, 2. there was much at stake, and 3. the risks posed by climate change were very high.



Figure 117. (v070a) Since 1996 the level of uncertainty in climate science has

127

Figure 118. (v070b) What was considered to be at stake has



dropped considerably 1 2 3 4 remained the same 5 6 7 increased considerably

Figure 119. (v070c) The level of risk associated with climate change has



dropped considerably 1 2 3 4 remained the same 5 6 7 increased considerably